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REFINING THE COMBUSTION MIXTURE: ENVIRONMENTAL
FEDERALISM AND OXYGENATED GASOLINE IN
EXXON MOBIL CORP. v EPA
I.

INTRODUCTION

"A remarkable, and largely unnoticed, change in environmental protection has occurred over the past five to [ten] years. The
states have become the primary environmental protection agencies
across the nation."1
Over the past decade, courts have grappled with the issue of
whether states may preempt a federal environmental regulatory
minimum with their own more rigorous standard. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
EPA2 said they could, at least concerning the minimum oxygen content of commercial fuel.3 Despite ambiguity in the text of the
Clean Air Act 4 (CAA), the Ninth Circuit marshaled legislative history, deference to the EPA's Final Rule, and overlapping sections of
CAA to uphold a broad reading of the statute, much to the dismay
5
of fuel marketers.
1. R. Steven Brown, ECOS: The States Protect the Environment (visited Oct. 10,
2000) <http://www.sso.org/ecos/publications/statesarticle.htm>. For a discussion
of the new "cooperative federalism," see infra note 10 and notes 201-20 and accompanying text.
2. 217 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2000).
3. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. United States EPA, 217 F.3d 1246, 1256 (9th Cir.
2000) (concluding that Clark County, Nevada's requirement that gasoline contains
at least 3.5% oxygen by weight does not conflict with or is not preempted by Clean
Air Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7 401-7671(q) (1994) [hereinafter CAA]).
4. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7 4 0 1 - 7 6 7 lq (mandating that states reduce CO emissions to
meet National Ambient Air Quality Standards) [hereinafter NAAQS].
5. See Exxon, 217 F.3d at 1256 (concluding that preemption would undermine
CAA's purposes because states may need to raise oxygenate level in gasoline to
meet NAAQS). Fuel marketers encountered difficulties using fuel additives such
as MTBE, because MTBE creates noxious odors when it invades water supplies and
is linked to various health and environmental problems. See Alan Bock, California
Gas Lobby, Environmental Groups Grapple With Fuel Additives, THE ORANGE CourTv
REGISTER (California), February 7, 2001, available at 2001 WL 12166798 (noting
implications of MTBE in health and environmental problems). The problem,
however, is that the most likely alternative, ethanol, is highly cost-inefficient. See
Quick Germ Technology May Decrease Future Gas Prices, THE PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington, IL), February 5, 2001, at 5 (noting that current rise in gasoline prices is believed due to rising production costs incurred through use of ethanol fuel
additive). Furthermore, in addition to incurring increased production costs for
the inclusion of fuel additives, the most recent data from the American Petroleum
Institute suggests a dramatic nationwide drop in the demand for gasoline. See
MTBE Prices Sink Back On Slight Demand, Returning Output, Oxy-FUEL NEWS, Febru-

(331)
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2001

1

332

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2001], Art.
5
[Vol.
VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

XlI: p. 331

In the face of federally-prescribed oxygenate minimums for
gasoline, the Ninth Circuit held that CAA actually assigns primary
responsibility for meeting National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) to the states. 6 This significant flexibility is tempered only
by EPA approval of a proposed revision to a State Implementation
Plan (SIP) .7 In the wake of recent Supreme Court decisions such as
New York v. United States8 and Printz v. United States,9 the Ninth Circuit balanced federal will against state flexibility and promoted "cooperative federalism." 10 This decision evidenced a practical
assessment of the tenuous compromise of environmental regulatory
ary 5, 2001, available at 2001 WL 9809906 (noting that national gas stocks have

climbed 8.14 million barrels over last year and that demand is at its lowest rate
since 1997). The battle between ethanol and MTBE manifested itself politically as
a struggle between The Renewable Fuels Association, an ethanol lobbyist, and the
state of California, which applied to the new EPA Administrator for a waiver of
EPA's mandate that motor fuels have oxygenates. See Bock, 2001 WL 12166798, at
*1 (discussing current political climate concerning ethanol and MTBE in California). The Ninth Circuit's holding in Exxon, which allows states to select higher
oxygenate minimums than the EPA minimums of which California already complains, will likely further increase production costs for fuel marketers. See infra
notes 219-24 and accompanying text.
6. See Exxon, 217 F.3d at 1256 (discussing assignment of NAAQS responsibilities directly to states).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(m) (1) (discussing plan revisions for CO non-attainment areas).
8. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
9. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
10. See Frona M. Powell, Property Rights, Federalism, and the Endangered Species
Act, 29 RFAL EST. L.J. 13, 14 (2000) (discussing "cooperative federalism," whereby
federal government regulations are implemented by states). "Cooperative federal-

ism" also impacts other areas of federal regulation. For example, the Hate Crimes
Prevention Act of 1999, which included Senator Edward M. Kennedy's Hate
Crimes Proposal, cites as its key strategy "a greater emphasis on the indirect impact
of federal cooperation in state enforcement" manifested by the proposal's "intention to bring only an occasional federal prosecution chosen from thousands of
cases .. " See Sara Sun Beale, FederalizingHate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive
Law, Or Tool For CriminalEnforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REv. 1227, 1265 (2000) (discuss-

ing cooperative federalism in context of Kennedy amendment to Hate Crimes Act
of 1999). The National Association of Attorneys General [hereinafter the Association] also embraced cooperative federalist strategies in its adoption of a resolution
to regulate online pharmaceutical companies. See Sean P. Haney, Pharmaceutical
Dispensing in the "Wild West": Advancing Health Care and Protecting Consumers Through
the Regulation of Online Pharmacies,42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 575, 605 (2000) (discuss-

ing Association's attempts to reduce duplicative state lawsuits against identical defendants via cooperative federalist efforts). In particular, the Association stated
that it intends for states remain the primary enforcers of laws concerning the
health of their citizens, and that the federal government provide nationwide injunctive relief. See id.; see also Kenneth I. Weissman, InteractiveJudicialFederalism:
Certified Questions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 373, 422 (2000) (promoting

inter-jurisdictional certification on grounds of benefits of cooperative federalism
in interests of judicial economy and efficiency); Phil Weiser, Paradigm Changes in
Telecommunications Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 819 (2000) (discussing cooperative federalism in telecommunications regulation).
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power between national federal policy and local environmental
concerns.
II.

FACTS

Clark County, Nevada is a serious non-attainment area for carbon monoxide (CO). 1 1 Winter weather conditions there trap CO
emissions in the Las Vegas Valley and further increase the CO air
concentration. 1 2 CAA specifies that each state with a non-attainment area for CO and whose CO concentration is greater than 9.5
parts per million (ppm) shall submit to the EPA Administrator (the
3
Administrator) a SIP revision regarding oxygenated gasoline.'
The Las Vegas Valley exhibited a CO concentration of 12.7 ppm as
of November 15, 1990.14

In September of 1997, Clark County drafted an amendment to
its SIP that required 3.5 percent minimum oxygen content for wintertime gasoline sold between October 1 and March 31.1 5 EPA issued a Final Rule in June of 1999 approving the Clark County
increase. 16 Exxon Mobil Corporation and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. initiated an action to seek review of EPA's Final Rule.' 7 Exxon
claimed that the 1990 Amendments to CAA provided a nationwide
minimum oxygenated fuel content of 2.7 percent for non-attainment areas and that CAA does not permit states to select a higher
11. See Exxon, 217 F.3d at 1248 (stating that Clark County, Nevada is a serious
non-attainment area for CO). For a description of a "non-attainment" area, see
infra note 45.
12. See id. (explaining that winter weather inversions trap CO emissions in Las
Vegas Valley). An "inversion" is a departure from the typical thermocline in the
vertical column of air at a given location. See Weather com Glossary: "Inversion" (visited Sept. 17, 2000) <http://www.weather.com/glossary/wx-glossary-i.html> (discussing nature of weather inversion).
This phenomenon can have potentially lethal consequences; in 1948, a fourday weather inversion killed eighteen people in Donora, Pennsylvania when it
trapped the choking emissions from the Pittsburgh steel mills over the town. See
Lynn Scarlett, Reason Public Policy Institute: "Green Guilt" Only Makes Things Worse
(visited Sept. 30, 2000) <http://www.rppi.org/opeds/gguilt.html>.
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(m)(1) (stating method of revision of State Implementation Plans [hereinafter SIP] for CO non-attainment areas that have higher
concentration of CO than 9.5 parts per million).
14. See EnvironmentalProtectionAgency: 40 CFR Ch. 1 (last modifiedJul. 1, 1998)
<http://www.epa.gov/epacfr4O/chapt-l.info/subch-C/40POO81/40PO081C/
40P81329.pdf> (displaying chart of Nevada pollution concentrations, including
CO).
15. See Exxon, 217 F.3d at 1248 (noting Clark County's 3.5% proposed amendment to its SIP in September 1997).
16. See id. (discussing EPA approval of Clark County SIP amendment).
17. See id. (noting basis for plaintiffs action).
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minimum.' 8 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Final Rule, holding
that EPA's approval of Nevada's revised SIP does not conflict with
and is not preempted by any provision of CAA. 19

III.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Problem of CO Emissions

2
CO is an invisible, odorless, and extremely poisonous gas. 11
When a human inhales air containing as little as 0.1 percent CO by
volume, CO replaces the oxygen in the bloodstream, resulting in a
lethal oxygen deficiency throughout the body. 2 1 Nearly three hundred people die each year from residential exposure to CO gener22
ated by combustion appliances.

In the United States, two-thirds of CO emissions into the atmosphere originate from anthropogenic sources, specifically transportation sources, such as motor vehicle exhaust. 23 In cities, motor
vehicle exhaust can contribute as much as 95 percent of all CO
18. See id. at 1249 (stating petitioner's claim that statute does not authorize
states to choose higher minimums).
19. See id. at 1256 (discussing Ninth Circuit's affirmation of EPA Final Rule
regarding Nevada's revised SIP that accepts Clark County's heightened oxygenated

gasoline content minimum).
20. See Larry Biland, United States Environmental Protection Agency Air Programs:
Finding On Las Vegas CO Plan (last modified August 31, 1999) <http://

www.epa.gov/region09/air/vegasco/fact.html > (discussing physical properties of
CO gas).
21. See id. (discussing physiological consequences of inhaling air containing

CO).
22. See THE AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION: FACT SHEET: CARBON MONOXIDE
(last modified Sept. 1999) <http://www.lungusa.org/air/carbon_factsheet99.
html> (discussing number of deaths and injuries each year resulting from CO
poisoning). The health threat is most serious for people with cardiovascular disease. See 1995 Air Quality: Status and Trends (visited February 9, 2001) <http://

www.epa.gov/oar/aqtrnd95/co.html> (discussing health and environmental effects of CO). Exposure to abnormal CO levels induces visual impairment, reduced
manual dexterity, and difficulty in performing complex tasks. See id. (discussing
external symptoms of CO poisoning).
23. See

THE

AMERICAN

LUNG

ASSOCIATION,

supra

note

22,

at <http://

www.lungusa.org/air/carbonfactsheet99.html> (noting that motor vehicles account for two-thirds of nation's CO emissions); see also ScoTrJ. CALLAN &JANET M.
THOMAS, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT: THEORY, POLICY, AND APPLICATIONS 293 (Gary Nelson, ed., Times Mirror Higher Education Group 1996) (discussing CO as anthropogenic pollutant). "Anthropogenic" means "caused by
human activity." See id. Transportation sources in the United States contribute
81% of all CO emissions nationwide. See EPA: 1995 NATIONAL AIR QUALITY STATUS
AND TRENDS: CARBON MONOXIDE (last modified Dec. 12, 1996) <http://
www.epa.gov/oar/aqtrnd95/co.html> (discussing highway motor vehicle CO emissions and their contribution to national CO pollution).
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emissions. 24 Gasoline that burns incompletely within the engine releases CO directly into the atmosphere via the tailpipe. 25 In response to this problem, Congress delegated authority to EPA under
CAA to create the NAAQS Program, which regulates CO, and other
pollutants, to "protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air
26
resources so as to promote the public health and welfare."
B.

The Statutory Scheme Regarding Oxygenated Fuel

Before 1970, most federal air pollution legislation consisted of
directives for increased federal research and impractical protocols
for settling interstate pollution problems. 27 After 1970, Congress
passed a series of comprehensive pollution control acts regulating
the environment on a broad, national level. 28 The 1970 CAA
amendments usurped significant authority to regulate air pollution
from the states and delivered it to the federal government but retained a substantial state role. 29 These more stringent amendments
firmly established the federal government as the principal force in

24. See EPA, supra note 23, at <http://www.epa.gov/oar/aqtrnd95/co.html>
(discussing inner city motor vehicle CO emissions).
25. See EPA: AUTOMOBILES AND CARBON MONOXIDE (last modified Jul. 20,
1998) <http://www.epa.gov/oms/03-co.htm> (discussing source of CO within motor vehicles).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (b)(1) (outlining CAA purpose and objectives). Under
the NAAQS Program, all new and existing sources of air pollution are prohibited
from emitting pollution that exceeds ambient air quality levels designated to protect public health and welfare. The program is implemented through source specific emissions limits detailed in SIPs. The program stipulates that newer pollutant
sources suffer more stringent control technology and permit requirements. As
part of CAA's focus on particular pollution problems, such as inhibited visibility
and hazardous conditions, the program concentrates all CAA requirements that
apply to a given source of air pollution in a comprehensive operating permit program. See Cindy Johnson, For Better Or Worse: Alternatives to Jail Time ForEnvironmental Crimes, 26 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Ctv. CONFINEMENT, 265, 269 n.30 (2000)
(citing THOMAS L. ADAMS ET. AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw HANDBOOK §2.1, at 72
(Thomas F.P. Sullivan ed., 14th ed. 1997).
27. SeeJohn P. Dwyer, The Practiceof Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD.
L. REv. 1183, 1191 (1995) (discussing history of federal air pollution regulation
before 1970).
28. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1994) (National Environmental Policy Act,
1969), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7661f (Clean Air Act, 1970), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1385
(1994) (Clean Water Act, 1972), 16 U.S.C. §§ 153144 (1994) (Endangered Species
Act, 1973), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1994) (Safe Drinking Water Act), 1974, 7
U.S.C. §§ 1 3 6-13 6 y (1994) (Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act,
1975), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k (1994) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
1976), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-71 (1994) (Toxic Substances Control Act, 1976).
29. See Dwyer, supra note 27, at 1192 (discussing how 1970 CAA amendments
anchored regulatory power in federal authority at expense of states).
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air pollution control.3 0 In effect, Congress aimed to obtain states'
assistance while molding their regulatory plans to execute federal
policy.

31

Current federal air pollution regulation strongly demonstrates
that the states' ability to regulate autonomously is significantly diminished.3 2 Yet recent Supreme Court federalism decisions are sig33
naling a retreat to an emphasis on state sovereignty.
Congressman Staggers, the floor manager for the House version of
the 1970 CAA amendments, emphasized the importance of state
initiative: "[T] he federal government sets the standards, we tell the
states what they must do and what standards they must meet. These
standards must be put into effect by the . . . states, and we expect
them to have the men to do the actual enforcing."3 4 The Supreme
Court, however, specifically held in New York v. United States3 5 that
"[S]tates are not mere political subdivisions of the United States.
State governments are neither regional offices nor administrative
agencies of the Federal Government. "36 CAA escapes this federalist
snare by limiting its mandate to states that fail to submit a SIP or
which submit an inadequate plan; only then are states subject to a

30. See id. (discussing increased stringency of 1970 CAA amendments as establishing dominant federal control).
31. See id. at 1193 (stating purpose of complex state roles in 1977 and 1990
CAA amendments was to bend states toward federal will).
32. See id. (concluding that current federal air pollution regulation strongly
suggests reduced ability of states to regulate autonomously).
33. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (voiding portions
of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 that forced states
to take liability for low-level radioactive waste generated within State for coercive
nature); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (striking down
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act for commandeering state police officers
for federal purposes); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (invalidating Violence Against Women Act because Commerce Clause did not provide
Congress with authority to enact civil remedy provisions inasmuch as provision was
not regulation of activity that substantially affected interstate commerce); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995) (voiding Gun-Free Schools Act of 1990
because it neither regulated commercial activity nor contained requirement that
possession be connected to interstate commerce).
34. 116 CONG. REc. 19, 204 (1970) (recording comments of Congressman
Staggers in support of 1970 CAA amendments and indispensability of state roles in
regulating air pollution).
35. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
36. New York, 505 U.S. at 188 (holding that states are not federal administrative agencies or subdivisions).
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Federal Implementation Plan (FIP). 3 7 Still, the SIP is subject to significant federal regulations, specifications, review, and approval. 38
The 1990 Amendments to CAA increased the quantity and type
of sources subject to federal regulation. 39 These amendments
greatly expanded the non-attainment provisions with stringent requirements formulated to enforce the NAAQS in highly polluted
areas. 40 Regarding the CO emissions problem, Congress enacted
sections of CAA that prescribe federal minimums for the oxygen
content of retail gasoline. 4 1 Federal courts recognize that oxygenating fuel reduces CO emissions by converting it into harmless car42
bon dioxide and water.

37. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1)(A) (1994) (directing that states which fail to
submit SIPs shall be subject to Federal Implementation Plans [hereinafter FIPs] of
EPA Administrator's promulgation).
38. See Dwyer, supra note 27 at 1194 (discussing significant federal role in
overseeing SIPs); see also Memorandum from J. Craig Potter, Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, Thomas L. Adams, Jr., Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring, and Francis S. Blake, General Counsel,
Office of General Counsel, to Addressees 2 (on file with author) [hereinafter
memorandum] (stating that SIP regulations that deviate from EPA's policy of
clearly worded and explicit rules are to be disapproved and promoting close scrutiny of SIP submissions). The memorandum was written to address problems in
SIP submissions concerning "vague, poorly defined rules;" it asserted that rules
should be "clear as to who must comply and by what date." Id. The memorandum
also asserted that any provisions, which allow for alternate techniques or any other
variations of the normal code must be completely and explicitly defined and must
make clear whether specific EPA approval is required. See id.
39. See Arnold W. Reitze, The Legislative History of U.S. Air Pollution Control, 36
Hous. L. REv. 679, 730 (Fall 1999) (discussing broadened scope of CAA due to
1990 CAA amendments regarding number and type of sources subject to
regulation).
40. See Dwyer, supra note 27, at 1194 (stating that 1990 CAA amendments
expanded restrictions applicable to non-attainment areas by providing specific requirements to ensure compliance).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(m) (2) (discussing federal minimums of oxygenated
gasoline content for non-attainment areas for CO). The primary aim of the oxygenated fuel requirements in CAA is to reduce CO emissions by adding extra oxygen to the combustion mixture, which achieves a more complete combustion. See
William M. Brown, Note, The Renewable Oxygenate Requirement: A Boon For the Environment Or a Boondoggle For the Ethanol Industry?, 41 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 1299, 130506 (1997) (discussing purpose of oxygenate fuel additive requirements in CAA).
Extra oxygen in the combustion mixture mitigates combustion deficiencies often
experienced in cold winter weather. See EPA RULES AND REGULATIONS: APPROVAL
AND PROMULGATION OF AiR QUALITY IMPLEMENTATION PLANS; COMMONWEALTH OF
VIRGINIA: OXYGENATED GASOLINE PROGRAM, 65 Fed. Reg. 8051, 8052 (2000) (ex-

plaining how addition of oxygen to combustion mixture enhances fuel combustion
and how fuel combustion is often less efficient in cold weather).
42. See Chrysler Corp. v. EPA, 631 F.2d 865, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing
ability of oxygen as fuel additive to reduce CO emissions by converting it to carbon
dioxide and water).
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Many states have enacted statutes that prevent their legislatures

from enforcing environmental controls more stringent than federal
prescriptions except in cases where the higher standard is necessary
for public health or to meet the federal air quality standards. 4 3 Nevada's air pollution control statute empowers its State Environmental Commission to establish fuel standards for mobile sources of air
contaminants that must achieve air quality standards that "protect
the health of the residents of the State of Nevada." 44 There is no
language that limits the Nevada Commission to the boundaries of
45
the regulations set by the federal government.
The 1990 Amendments also established a symbiotic approach
to providing clean air; they maintain federal authority to set standards but assign primary responsibility for meeting those standards
to the states. 46 CAA requires each state to adopt and submit to the
EPA Administrator a plan that provides for the implementation,
maintenance, and enforcement of air quality standards within three
years of the promulgation of the NAAQS. 47 Each SIP must include
enforceable emission limitations and control measures to meet
48
these standards.
More specific instructions are set forth in section 7545 of CAA
for those locations dubbed "non-attainment" areas, because the
higher concentrations of CO in these areas significantly threaten
national air quality. 49 Section 7545 requires each state with a non-

attainment area for CO to submit a plan revision that contains provisions regarding the usage of oxygenated gasoline. 50 Specifically,
43. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27A, § 2-5-114 (West 1994) (empowering
Oklahoma to promulgate air pollution regulations more stringent than federal
standards only upon determination by Council that more stringent standards are
necessary to protect public health or environment); see also R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-235(12) (1993) (prohibiting Rhode Island from adopting emission controls more
stringent than federal standards unless it can be shown that they are needed to
meet air quality standards).
44. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 445B.210(8) (1997).
45. See id.
46. See Reitze, supra note 39, at 725 (discussing dualism of 1990 CAA amendments in terms of dividing air pollution control between federal government and
states).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (1) (stating requirements imposed upon states regarding SIPs).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2) (A) (discussing elements of SIP, procedures for
submission, and provisions for implementing SIP in each state region).
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (m)(1)(A). A "non-attainment area" describes any
area that does not meet the national ambient air quality standard for a specific
pollutant. See 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d) (1) (A) (i) (defining term "non-attainment" for
the purposes of statute).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(m) (1) (A) (stating requirements of SIP revisions for
CO non-attainment areas).
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the plan revision must contain provisions that require essentially all
commercial gasoline to contain not less than 2.7 percent oxygen by
51
weight.
C.

The Smog of the Surrounding Case Law

CAA is regarded as the most controversial environmental law
ever enacted. 52 Its sheer complexity results in considerable state
resistance and compels substantial expenditure in oversight resources and costly litigation. 53 Although the federal circuit courts
have confronted several of the complex provisions of CAA, most
circuits held, despite differing fact scenarios and case contexts, that
states may promulgate stricter pollution control standards than fed54
eral law requires.
The Supreme Court set forth standards of statutory interpretation with specific reference to EPA and CAA in Chevron v. National
Resources Defense Council.5 5 The Court constructed a two-part inquiry

to determine if an agency's interpretation of a statute is permissible. 56 The threshold question is whether Congress unambiguously
expressed its intent in the statute. 5 7 If the intent is clear, the inquiry ends, and the court must give the congressional intent effect. 58 If a statute is silent or ambiguous concerning a specific issue,

51. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(m) (2) (discussing minimum oxygenate fuel requirements for CO non-attainment areas).
52. SeeJonathan H. Adler, The Green Aspects of Printz: The Revival of Federalism
and Its Implicationsfor EnvironmentalLaw, 6 GEO. MASON L. REx,. 573, 617 (opining

that CAA is most contentious environmental law ever enacted).
53. SeeJoshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only From a National
Perspective)for FederalEnvironmentalProtection,7 DuKE ENvrL. L. & PoL'Y F. 225, 307

(1997) (discussing regulatory failures under CAA); see also David Schoenbrod, The
Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1223, 1226

(1985) (noting that "[d]elegation can set in motion a protracted game that frustrates statutory goals... the [CAA] suggests that government is sometimes less able
to cope with delegation than without it").
54. See infra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
55. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-46 (1984) (setting forth standards for agency interpretations of statutory scheme that it administers).
56. See id. (directing judicial inquiry into agencies' statutory interpretation
through question of congressional intent and reasonableness of agencies'
interpretation).
57. See id. at 842 (describing preliminary question of clear congressional intent when interpreting agency's construction of statute).
58. See id. at 84243 (holding that courts must give effect to congressional intent if it is clear and unambiguous).
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courts must decide whether the agency's interpretation is a reasona-

59
ble construction of the statute.

Furthermore, the Court recognized that courts should afford
agencies significant weight and deference regarding their interpretations of statutory schemes they are entrusted to administer. 60 In
Chevron, the Court held that the Administrator's interpretation of
the term "stationary source" under CAA was permissible because it
was a reasonable construction of competing interests and is entitled
to deference. 6 1 Specifically, the regulatory scheme is complex and
EPA considered the matter in detail, and the decision involves rec62
onciling conflicting policies.
The Supreme Court's holdings in New York State Conf. of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co. 63 and in Medtronic, Inc.
v. Lohr 64 provide for furtherjudicial deference in the realm of state
police powers. 65 In Travelers, the Court held that in analyzing preemption claims, courts must begin with the assumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law. 6 6 Furthermore, the
59. See id. at 843 (holding that in cases of statutory ambiguity courts must
decide whether agency's interpretation is permissible). Moreover, the Chevron
Court held that if Congress explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to generate a specific provision via
regulation, because the power of administering a congressionally created program
necessarily requires rule and policy formulation to fill these gaps. See id. These
regulations are to be given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious,
or patently contrary to the statute. See id. at 844. The Chevron Court also held that
if a legislative delegation to an agency appears implicit rather than explicit, a court
may not supplant a reasonable construction of the statute with its own interpretation. See id.
60. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (affording executive agencies considerable
weight and deference concerning their interpretations of statutes they were assigned to administer). The Court in particular noted that this type of deference is
especially employed when the interpretation of the statute involves reconciling
conflicting policies where extraordinary circumstantial knowledge of the matters
involved is required. See id. These interpretations should not be overturned unless
it appears from the statute or its legislative history that Congress would not have
supported the interpretation. See id. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367
U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961)); see also United States v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 908 F.
Supp. 835, 843 (D. Colo. 1995) (upholding more stringent pollution monitoring
standards adopted in Colorado's SIP because Administrator approved version of
Colorado's SIP that included these measures).
61. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (upholding EPA Administrator construction
of "stationary source" because it involved reconciliation of conflicting policies and
competing interests in patently technical and complex context).
62. See id.
63. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
64. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
65. See New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Traveler's Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 654-55 (1995); Medtronic Inc., v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996).
66. See Travelers,514 U.S. at 654 (holding that preemption analysis begins with
assumption that Congress did not intend to supplant state law).
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Travelers Court held that in cases where federal law is alleged to bar
state action in fields of traditional state regulation, the Court has
assumed that the historic state police powers are not superseded by
federal acts unless that was the "clear and manifest purpose of Congress. ' 67 The Medtronic Court similarly held that "States traditionally have had great latitude under their police powers to legislate as
to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of
all persons," because the health and safety of a state's citizens are
"primarily, and historically, . . . matter[s] of local concern. '6
Most of the federal circuits construe CAA's provisions and the
role of the Administrator to permit states to select higher minimum
standards. 69 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Her Majesty the Queen In Right of the Province of Ontario v. City of Detroit70 held
that CAA preempts state law only to the extent that state law is not
as strict as the emissions limitations established in the federal statute. 7 1 Specifically, the Sixth Circuit expressly stated that CAA
adopts only minimum air quality levels, and that "states are free to
adopt more stringent protections." 72 The Sixth Circuit stated in
67. See id. at 655 (holding that areas of traditional state regulation are not
preempted by federal law unless congressional intent is manifest and clear).
68. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 475.
69. See infra notes 70-83 and accompanying text.
70. 874 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1989).
71. See id. at 342 (holding that CAA preempts state law only if state emissions
limitations are not as strict as federal regulations).
72. See id. at 343 (holding that CAA allows states to adopt more stringent environmental regulatory protections than those prescribed in CAA). The Ontario
court relied on 42 U.S.C. § 7416, which provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right of any State
...to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting control
or abatement of air pollution; except that . . . such State . . . may not
adopt or enforce any emission standard or limitation which is less stringent than the standard under [its SIP] or [Section 7411 or Section 7412].
42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1989).
The current version of section 7416 excepts the provisions of sections 7543 and
7
545(c) (4). See 42 U.S.C. § 7416. Section 7543 precludes states from adopting
emissions standards relating to new motor vehicles and nonroad vehicles. See 42
U.S.C. § 7543. Section 7545(c)(4) precludes states from adopting fuel additive
requirements if the Administrator finds that no such control is necessary or if the
Administrator has already prescribed a control. Yet § 7545 also states at (c) (4) (C)
that "[a] State may prescribe and enforce, for the purposes of motor vehicle emission control, a control or prohibition respecting the use of a fuel or fuel additive
in a motor vehicle . . . if an applicable [SIP] so provides." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7545(c)(4)(C). But see United States v. Ford Motor Company, 814 F.2d 1099,
1102 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting that standards for purification of ambient air supply
cannot be set along state boundaries). The Sixth Circuit specifically noted that if
state control of ambient air emissions were final, industries characteristically contributing heavily to air pollution would summarily relocate to states with the most
lenient pure air standards, severely skewing inter-state industrial competition. See
id.
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Southeastern Oakland County Resource Recovery Auth. v. City of Madison
Heights7 3 that "nowhere does the CAA affirmatively grant local gov-

ernments the independent power to regulate air pollution. Rather,
a local legislature's power to regulate in this area is subject ...

to

the minimum standards of the CAA ....
The Supreme Court
concluded in Union Electric Company v. EPA75 that states may submit
76
implementation plans more stringent than federal requirements.
The Union Court also held that the Administrator must approve
77
SIPs if they meet minimum CAA requirements.
",74

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. EPA78 that states may enforce stricter pollution controls

than those in the EPA-approved SIP, so long as the standards are
not less restrictive than an applicable federal implementation
plan. 79 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in Indiana & Michigan Electric Company v. EPA80 that the Administrator has
an obligation to insure that SIPs meet federal minimums only; the
fact that an SIP delineates requirements that are more stringent
than federal mandates does not automatically warrant the plan's
disapproval. 8' The Seventh Circuit adopted the Court of Appeals
82
for the Fourth Circuit's holding in Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA,
which declared that "states .

.

. could be as tough on polluters as

they wished, but that no state could allow industry to exceed federal
standards

....

"813

73. 5 F.3d 166 (6th Cir. 1993).
74. See id. at 169 (holding that all state legislation regulating air pollution is
subject to minimum standards of CAA). The Sixth Circuit also noted in Ohio Envtl.
Council v. United States District Court that "[the CAA] clearly envisions the possibility
of continuous adjustments to the basic plan by the State and the EPA." Ohio
Envtl. Council v. United States District Court, 565 F.2d 393, 398 (6th Cir. 1977).
75. 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
76. See id. at 265 (concluding that states may submit SIPs with more stringent
pollution requirements than federal mandates). The Union Court used this conclusion to hold that CAA provides no basis for an Administrator "ever to reject a
[SIP] on the ground that it is economically or technologically infeasible." Id.
77. See id. (concluding that EPA Administrator must approve SIPs that meet
minimum requirements under CAA).
78. 508 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 425 U.S. 987
(1976).
79. See id. at 748 (holding that states may enforce stricter pollution controls
than those included in their SIPs).
80. 509 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1975).
81. See id. at 844 (holding that Administrator cannot disapprove SIP because
it provides for requirements exceeding federal minimums).
82. 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973).
83. See Indiana & Michigan Electric, 509 F.2d at 844 n.2 (quoting Appalachian
Power Co., 477 F.2d at 498). The Fourth Circuit also held that states were expected
to consider "local factors, such as 'meteorological conditions, topographical con-
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, explicitly guarded against varying emissions standards among the states in
American Automobile Manufacturers Ass'n. v. Cahill.84 In addressing

the preemption issue raised by the plaintiffs, the Second Circuit
clearly differentiated between the concepts of "emissions standards"
and "enforcement mechanisms," holding that a percentage Zero
Emissions Vehicle (ZEV) sales requirement was an emission standard. 85 The Second Circuit therefore concluded that a percentage
ZEV sales requirement imposed on automobile manufacturers by
the State of New York is preempted by CAA, because upholding it
would risk the adoption of further mutations of the California emissions standard in other states.8 6 For example, the Second Circuit
notes that "[w]ere we to uphold New York's ZEV sales requirement
...then a third state might adopt ZEV sales requirements... leading to at least four different regulatory schemes: federal, California,
87
New York, and the third state."
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Association of InternationalAutomobile Manufacturers, Inc. v. Commissioner, Massachusetts
text, and economic and social demands." Appalachian Power Co., 477 F.2d at 498-99
(discussing other state considerations in SIP formulation).
84. See American Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 1998).
In Cahill, the State of New York adopted the California emissions standards under
the "opt-in" provision of CAA, with some differences. See id. at 199 (noting that
New York's Low Emissions Vehicle program did not include medium-duty vehicles
that were included in California's Zero Emissions Vehicle (ZEV) requirements).
Section 7507 allows any state to adopt any emissions standards for new motor vehicles if the standards are identical to California's standards for which California has
obtained a federal waiver and if both the state and California adopt the standards
two years before the commencement of the vehicle model year. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7507; see also H.R.REP. No. 294, 310 (1977) (declaring that "States are not authorized to adopt or enforce standards other than the California standards").
85. See Cahill, 152 F.3d at 200 (discussing whether ZEVs sales requirement is
state standard that may be preempted under CAA or enforcement provision that
would not be preempted). In its view, an emissions standard is a regulatory measure intended to lower emissions levels, whereas an enforcement mechanism is a
device intended to give effect to the regulatory standard. See id. (enumerating
difference between emissions standards and enforcement mechanisms). The Second Circuit held in Cahill that a ZEV percentage sales requirement is an emissions
standard, because it is a command having a direct effect on the level of emissions
rather than a method of enforcing a command. See id.
86. See id. at 201 (explaining that upholding New York ZEV sales requirement
would lead to unacceptable plurality of emissions standards).
87. Cahill, 152 F.3d at 201 (illustrating danger of multiple state regulatory
schemes concerning emissions standards by example). The CAA California Emissions provision was inserted so that states wrestling with their own pollution
problems could adopt California's more stringent emission controls. See H.R.REP.
No. 294, 309-10 (1977). The provision also prevents manufacturers from having to
produce widely varying cars to meet disparate state emission standards. See id. at
309.
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Department of Environmental Protection,88 held that emissions "standards" refer to "regulations on quantitative levels of emissions."8 9
However, the First Circuit distinguishes between "simply monitoring or enforcing compliance with some distinct numerical emissions standard" and effecting a quantitative reduction in
emissions. 90 In Massachusetts Dep't. of Envtl. Protection, the First Circuit held that Massachusetts' ZEV mandates were standards because
they attempted to achieve a quantitative reduction in emissions and
were presumptively preempted. 9 1 In contrast, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia held in Louisiana EnvironmentalAction
Network v. Browner92 that CAA mandates federal regulation of emissions of air pollutants but expressly does not preempt states from
adopting or enforcing their own regulations, referring specifically
9
to the submission of the SIP. 3
The Second Circuit noted, however, in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n. of the United States, Inc. v. New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation9 4 (MVMA I) that although state regulation of emissions other than California is directly linked to approved California actions, state fuel regulation plans will only avoid
preemption by successful demonstration of necessity to the Administrator. 9 5 In MVMA I, the Second Circuit held that whether New
York may regulate motor vehicle fuels and how it may do so de96
pends upon its need to meet NAAQS.

88. 208 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000).
89. See id. at 6 (quoting Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095,
1112-13 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). The First Circuit held further that numerical production requirements are standards relating to the control of emissions. See id. at 7.
90. See MassachusettsDep't of Envtl. Prot., 208 F.3d at 7 (distinguishing between
enforcing abstract numerical standard and effecting quantitative reduction in
emissions).
91. See id. (relying on 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a), which explicitly revokes states' ability to adopt or enforce emissions standard for new vehicles or new engines).
92. 87 F.3d 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
93. See id. at 1381 (holding that CAA expressly does not preempt states from
adopting or enforcing their own regulations). The D.C. Circuit drew this conclusion from 42 U.S.C. § 7416. See id. For the text of § 7416, see supra note 72.
94. 810 F. Supp. 1331 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 17 F.3d 521 (2d
Cir. 1994).
95. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. New York State
Dep't of Envtl. Conserv., 810 F. Supp. 1331, 1343 (N.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd on other
grounds, 17 F.3d 521 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining different treatment of state emissions regulations and state fuel regulations under CAA).
96. See id. (holding that State of New York's ability to regulate fuels turns on
its need to meet NAAQS).
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The crux of Exxon's argument in Exxon, consisted of a narrow
interpretation of CAA's section 7545. 97 Exxon claimed that the
1990 amendments to CAA preclude the states from implementing
higher oxygen content minimums than the 2.7 percent figure specified in the statute.9 8 To resolve this question, the Ninth Circuit first
examined the 1990 amendments to decide whether the EPA Final
Rule was a permissible reading of the statute. 99 After concluding
that EPA's construction was permissible, the Ninth Circuit then
sought to determine whether the higher minimum was preempted
under section 211 of CAA. 0 0
A.

The EPA Final Rule Was a Permissible Construction of the
Statute

The Ninth Circuit began with an analysis of the text of CAA, as
amended in 1990, regarding the requirements for oxygenated gasoline in CO non-attainment areas. 10 1 In relevant part, the text of
section 7545 (m)(2) states, "Each plan revision under this subsection shall contain provisions to require that any gasoline sold, or
dispensed, to the ultimate consumer in the CO non-attainment
area.., be blended... to contain not less than 2. 7 percent oxygen by
weight."'1 2 EPA claimed that this provision demands a minimum
oxygenated gasoline content of 2.7 percent but allows states to mandate a higher oxygen standard, because the provision establishes a
federal "floor" but no "ceiling.' u0 3 To ascertain the congressional
97. See Exxon, 217 F.3d at 1249 (discussing petitioner's primary argument).
98. See id. (interpreting 1990 amendments to CAA).
99. See id. The Ninth Circuit determined first that "in reviewing a final action
by the EPA, [it] reverse[s] only if [the Rule] is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to
law or if it exceeds the statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations." Id. at 1248
(quoting Abramowitz v. EPA, 832 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 1987)). The Ninth
Circuit next concluded that in reviewing EPA's reading of the statute, it must "ask
whether the intent of Congress is clear and, if not, whether the agency's construction is permissible." Id.
100. See Exxon, 217 F.3d at 1253 (discussing Ninth Circuit's preemption analysis under § 211).
101. See id. at 1249 (discussing Ninth Circuit's basis for concluding that its
analysis begins with CAA's oxygenated gasoline requirement). The Ninth Circuit
held that "the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute
itself." Id. (quoting Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(m) (2) (emphasis added) (describing oxygenated fuel
requirements for CO non-attainment areas).
103. See Exxon, 217 F.3d at 1249 (discussing EPA's assertion that broad reading of § 7545(m) (2) controls).
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intent of the statute, the Ninth Circuit's textual interpretation be14
gan with an analysis of the statute as a whole. 0
The Ninth Circuit first noted that CAA allows for any minimum oxygen content as is necessary for the attainment of the
NAAQS in section 7512a(b) (3) (A). 10 5 Section 7512(b) (3) (A), entitled "Serious Areas: Oxygenated Gasoline," in relevant part,
provides:

Within two years after November 15, 1990,[each]
State shall submit a revision to require that gasoline sold
...in the Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (as
defined by the United States Office of Management and
Budget) .. .be blended . . .with fuels containing such

levels of oxygen as is necessary, to provide for the attainment of the CO national ambient air quality standard...
and maintenance of the national ambient air quality stan10 6
dard thereafter in the area.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that although this provision precisely
defines the geographic scope of the regulation and promulgates a
fixed deadline for attainment, it is flexible in its oxygen requirement and must be construed consistently with section
7545 (m) (2).107

Next, after concluding that the statute was ambiguous regarding the 2.7 percent requirement, the Ninth Circuit applied the
holding of Chevron to conclude that any reasonable interpretation
of the statute is sufficient absent clear congressional intent.10 8
Under Chevron, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that it was not required
to "conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted ...

or even the reading the Ninth Cir-

cuit would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a
judicial proceeding."' 0 9 The Exxon court also noted the Chevron
104. See id. (stating that Ninth Circuit's determination of congressional intent
is derived from consideration of whole statute).
105. See id. at 1250 (noting that elsewhere CAA allows for oxygen minimum
that meets NAAQS). The Ninth Circuit then stated that it must construe the two
overlapping sections of the statute consistently. See id. (quoting Dep't of Revenue
of Oregon v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 340-41, (1994)).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 7512a(b) (3) (A).
107. See Exxon, 217 F.3d at 1250 (discussing § 7512(a)'s flexible oxygen requirements); see also Brown, supra note 41 (discussing consistent reading of both
provisions of statute).
108. See Exxon, 217 F.3d at 1250 (concluding that any reasonable agency interpretation is sufficient absent clear congressional intent).
109. Id. (discussing whether agency's construction was permissible).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol12/iss2/5

16

Federalism and Oxy
2001] Mahoney: Refining the Combustion
EXXON Mixture:
MOBILEnvironmental
CORP.

court's holding that CAA assigns primary responsibility for assuring
air quality to the states." 0 As a result, the Ninth Circuit held that
EPA's reading of the statute is permissible so long as it is a reasonable interpretation absent clear congressional intent."'
The Ninth Circuit then applied these conclusions to resolving
the ambiguity in section 7545. Section 7545 states "not less than 2.7
percent," as a result, the Ninth Circuit noted that it is not clear
whether Congress intended to require that the minimum must be
specifically 2.7 percent or that it merely has to be no less than 2.7
percent. 12 Armed with evidence of flexible minimums elsewhere
in the statute and the Chevron reasonableness test, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that states retain the authority to require a minimum
oxygenate standard greater than 2.7 percent under CAA. 1" 3 The
Ninth Circuit determined that EPA's reading was permissible be14
cause it was reasonable in the context of the structure of CAA.'
Since the environmental regulatory scheme of oxygenated gasoline
under CAA essentially rests in state enforcement through SIPs, and
because states must revise these plans to meet the requirements of
the NAAQS, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that EPA's conclusion of
15
state authority is reasonable in the context of the statute.'
To buttress this conclusion further, the Ninth Circuit then examined the statute's legislative history to glean the true congressional intent.1 16 The Ninth Circuit noted in particular Senator
Wirth's comment, which explained that he understood the 1990
amendment proposal to explicitly allow for the possibility of individual states to select higher oxygen content minimums.' 17 Congressman Richardson's comment also guided the Ninth Circuit:
"IT]he Richardson-Madigan provision [adopting the 2.7 percent
110. See id. (noting that CAA holds states primarily responsible for air quality
under Chevron).
111. See id.; see also Brown, supra note 41.
112. See Exxon, 217 F.3d at 1251 (explaining ambiguity in § 7545 concerning
required oxygenate content).
113. SeeExxon, 217 F.3d at 1251 (concluding that states have authority to raise
oxygenate minimums after considering statutory structure and context).
114. See id. (accepting EPA reasoning after regarding statute in its entirety).
115. See id. (explaining that responsibility of meeting NAAQS under statute
remains with states through revision of SIPs). The Ninth Circuit also claimed that
although this evidence does not summarily resolve the ambiguity in the statute, it
issufficiently persuasive evidence to support the reasonableness of EPA's construction and should be entitled to Chevron deference. See id.
116. See id. (stating necessity of examining legislative history if statute is
unclear).
117. See Exxon, 217 F.3d at 1251-52 (noting Senator Wirth's understanding
that 1990 amendments still allow states to select higher oxygen content
minimums).
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minimum] does not mandate a 'recipe' or so-called government gas
... instead the amendment established minimum basic standards to
reduce ... toxic air pollutants in gasoline." 118 Senator Burdick explained that the amendments were not intended to affect existing
states' rights. 1 9 The Ninth Circuit read this particular comment in
conjunction with section 116 of CAA, which states that "nothing in
this act shall preclude or deny the right of any State... to adopt or
enforce . . . any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air
120
pollutants."
In addition, the Ninth Circuit found the dialogue between Senator Kohl and Senator Baucus, one of the bill managers, most useful.' 2' Senator Kohl stated that he understood the current law to
allow states to select a more rigorous standard if they so desired and
22
asked Senator Baucus if the amendments maintain this authority.
Senator Baucus replied that "[states] will be allowed to regulate fuels and fuel additives under the SIP. The Administrator of the
[EPA] shall allow this State action if he or she finds the State control is necessary to meet national primary or secondary air quality
standards.' 23 The Ninth Circuit then concluded that although the
legislative history does not resolve the statutory ambiguity completely, it supports the conclusion that EPA's construction was rea24
sonable and is entitled to Chevron deference.
B.

Clark County's Oxygen Standard Is Not Preempted Under
Section 7545(c) (4) (A) of CAA
CAA states at section 7545 (c) (4) (A), in relevant part, that:
no State may prescribe or attempt to enforce ... any control or prohibition respecting any characteristic or component of a fuel . . . (i) if the Administrator has found that
no control is necessary ... or (ii) if the Administrator has

118. Id. (discussing Congressman Richardson's understanding of amended
oxygen minimum).
119. See id. at 1253 (discussing Senator Burdick's comment that amendments
do not abrogate any existing State rights).
120. Id. (discussing Senator Burdick's comment in conjunction with § 116).
121. See id. (discussing dialogue between Senators Kohl and Baucus).
122. See Exxon, 217 F.3d at 1253 (discussing Senator Kohl's understanding of
state authority under 1990 amendments).
123. See id. at 1256 (quoting Senator Baucus' reply that states are permitted to
regulate fuels under SIPs to meet NAAQS under EPA approval).
124. See id. (discussing Ninth Circuit's assertion that legislative history,
though not conclusive, supports EPA's broad interpretation).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol12/iss2/5

18

2001]

Mahoney: Refining the Combustion
Federalism and Oxy 349
CORP.
MOBILEnvironmental
EXXON Mixture:

prescribed... a control or prohibition applicable to such
characteristic . . .unless [the controls are identical].125

Exxon claimed that Clark County's 3.5 percent standard is preempted under this section because EPA already promulgated a different minimum oxygen requirement. 126 The Ninth Circuit found,
however, that the text of CAA explicitly protects the authority of
states to regulate air pollution.127 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit also
noted that the Supreme Court is highly deferential to state law in
areas traditionally regulated by the states.1 2 8 Finally, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that the overriding purpose of CAA is to force states
29
to achieve the NAAQS by regulating pollution effectively.'
The Ninth Circuit conducted the first part of its textual analysis
at the beginning of CAA in section 7401.130 Section 7401, entitled
"Congressional Findings," states, "air pollution prevention .. .and

air pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of
states and local governments."' 1 3 ' Second, the Ninth Circuit looked
to section 7407, which assigns responsibility to the states for assuring air quality within the entire area comprising the state through
the use of the SIP to achieve the NAAQS.' 3 2 Third, the Ninth Circuit examined section 7416, entitled, "Retention of State Authority." 33 Section 7416 specifically states that "nothing in this chapter
shall preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision
thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions .. .or (2) any requirement respecting control . . .of
3 4
air pollution."'

Next, the Ninth Circuit applied Supreme Court precedent concerning deference to state law in areas traditionally regulated by
125. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c) (4) (A) (limiting state authority to prescribe controls
or prohibitions).
126. See Exxon, 217 F.3d at 1254 (discussing petitioner's claim for preemption
under CAA).
127. See id. (discussing textual support in CAA for explicit protection of state
authority to regulate air pollution).
128. See id. at 1255 (discussing Supreme Court precedential support for deference to state law in areas traditionally regulated by states).
129. See id. (discussing overriding purpose of CAA in favor of state authority
to regulate air pollution).
130. See id. (beginning textual analysis of CAA by examining § 7401).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 7401.
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (assigning responsibility to states for realization
of NAAQS through SIPs).
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (stating that broad authority of states to adopt any
standard or requirement for air pollution control is not precluded in CAA).
134. Id.
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states. 13 5 Primarily, the Ninth Circuit looked to New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Company,
which held that the Supreme Court always addresses questions of

preemption beginning with the presumption that Congress does
not intend to supplant state law. 136 Specifically, the Supreme Court
held that:
in cases like this one, where federal law is said to bar state
action in fields of traditional state regulation ...

we have

worked on the 'assumption that the historic police powers
of the states were not to be superseded by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.

37

The Ninth Circuit concluded that air pollution falls within the
ambit of state police powers under the more general category of
"protecting the health of state citizens."' 138 Furthermore, the Ninth
Circuit noted that environmental regulation traditionally has been
a state endeavor. 13 9 Upon this premise, the Ninth Circuit supported its conclusion of the preemption immunity presumption by
applying the holding in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, which clearly directed that preemption analysis, especially regarding state police
powers, presumes at its inception that police powers are not preempted. 140 Tracking the Supreme Court's reasoning, the Ninth
Circuit stated that since protecting the health and safety of citizens
was primarily a matter of local concern, states have traditionally
been afforded significant deference under the police power doctrine in legislating to protect these interests.' 4 ' Finally, the Ninth
Circuit referenced the Supreme Court's holding in Union Electric
Co., which stated that "the states may submit implementation plans
more stringent than federal law requires and that the Administrator

135. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
136. See Exxon, 217 F.3d at 1255 (discussing Supreme Court's penchant for
presuming that Congress does not intend to supplant state law in preemption
clauses).
137. Id.
138. See Exxon, 217 F.3d at 1255 (discussing why air pollution regulation is
state police power).
139. See id. (noting that environmental regulation has traditionally been responsibility of states).
140. See id. (holding that preemption analyses begin with presumption that
police powers are not preempted).
141. See id. (discussing great latitude afforded states in legislating to protect
health and safety of citizens under police powers).
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must approve such plans if they meet the minimum requirements
1 42
of [section] 110(a)(2)."'
The Ninth Circuit concluded that since regulating air pollution falls within the scope of state police powers, the authority of
43
the states is not preempted without clear congressional intent.
Here, the preemption provisions of CAA focus on the regulation of
fuel additives, not on oxygenate standards, so the Ninth Circuit
held that they do not demonstrate such a clear and manifest purpose to preempt state regulation of oxygenate levels.' 44 Furthermore, states with CO non-attainment areas must maintain standards
that meet the national air quality minimums to fulfill the purpose
45
of CAA.1
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the overriding purpose
of CAA is to force states to regulate air pollution so as to meet the
NAAQS. 14 6 More specifically, local planning initiatives culminating
in SIPs provide the appropriate mechanism for realizing this goal;
47
failing to achieve it warrants penalties and the imposition of FIPs. 1
States, therefore, have the responsibility and the incentive to meet
the national minimums. 48 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit noted
that the preemption provisions would violate the purpose of CAA if
they were construed to prohibit states that need to raise the minimum oxygenate standard from exceeding the national minimum. 149 For these reasons the Ninth Circuit affirmed the EPA
142. Id. (quoting Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 265 (1976)). In
Union the Court held that states may submit SIPs with more stringent standards
than federal law requires. See Union, 427 U.S. at 265. The Union Court, however,
was concerned with the capacity of a producer of sulphur dioxide emissions to
challenge an SIP on the grounds that it is technologically or economically infeasible to comply with the plan. See id. at 249 (framing issue to be decided). The
Ninth Circuit held that it may not. See id. at 269 (stating that economic and technological infeasibility are considerations wholly foreign to Administrator's analysis
of SIPs).
143. See Exxon, 217 F.3d at 1256 (concluding that air pollution regulation is
within historic state police power doctrine).
144. See id. (holding that CAA preemption provisions do not preclude state
regulation of oxygenate levels because provisions focus on regulation of fuel additives, not oxygenate standards).
145. See id. (defending conclusion that preemption provisions do not apply
because states must maintain levels to meet NAAQS to fulfill CAA goals).
146. See id. at 1255 (holding that overriding purpose of CAA is to force states
to achieve NAAQS).
147. See id. at 1255-56 (discussing SIPs as CAA mechanism of achieving
NAAQS and structured penalties, including FIPs).
148. See Exxon, 217 F.3d at 1256 (noting that states have responsibility and
incentive to meet NAAQS).
149. See id. (explaining that construing preemption provisions narrowly
against states could potentially violate CAA goals of meeting NAAQS).
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Final Rule approving the Clark County oxygenate standard, holding that it does not conflict with and is not preempted by any provi50
sion of CAA.
V.

A.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

CAA in Its Entirety Supports the Ninth Circuit's Holding of
State Discretion to Raise Federal Minimums

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Exxon properly achieves a tenable, pragmatic balance of federal environmental regulatory mandates and states' local environmental concerns.' 5' A reading of
CAA as a whole supports the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that CAA
allows states considerable latitude in implementing oxygenate requirements to achieve NAAQS. 15 2 First, the findings and purpose
of CAA as outlined by Congress support this conclusion.-15 3 Second,
the sanctions imposed on states for inadequate or non-extant SIPs
154
strongly suggest state responsibility and flexibility.
Congress explicitly found in CAA that "Federal financial assistance and leadership is essential for the development of cooperative Federal [and] State programs .... "155 Moreover, Congress
concluded that air pollution prevention "at its source is the primary
responsibility of states and local governments." 156 Congress also
stated that its purpose under CAA was to provide technical and financial assistance to state and local governments to aid them in
executing their pollution control programs. 157 Additionally, other
federal environmental regulatory acts delineate congruent objectives and structure. For example, the Clean Water Act similarly assigns primary responsibility for water pollution control to the
150. See id. (affirming EPA Final Rule mandating 3.5% oxygenate standard in
Clark County during winter months).
151. See John P. Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption:
Lessons From Environmental Regulation, 60 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 203 (1997)
(noting that congressional need to customize environmental policy to local conditions and federal desire for state technical and personnel resources compels Congress to share its regulatory authority).
152. See infra notes 161-73 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 101-07 and 112-24 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (a) (4) (explaining congressional finding that federal financial assistance and leadership is necessary to develop cooperative connections
between federal government and states).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (a) (3) (assigning primary responsibility for pollution
prevention to states and local governments).
157. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (3) (stating purpose of CAA is to provide assistance to states in execution of local pollution control programs).
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states. 158 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act also identifies solid waste management as a national concern but preserves
state responsibility for its collection and disposal. 159 These findings
and specific goals verify that Congress contemplates State initiative
to develop and execute pollution control measures and that the
federal government essentially serves to assist states in meeting federal standards.1 60
Although the Exxon court primarily reconciled sections
7512a(b) (3) (A) and 7545(m) (2), CAA also requires a state that has
not achieved the national air quality standard for CO in a non-attainment area to submit a revised plan detailing an economic incentive program (EIP) 16 , that may include any transportation
control measure outlined in section 7408(f).1 6 2 The transportation
controls in section 7408(f) include programs to reduce motor vehicle emissions consistent with subchapter II of CAA. 163 These controls are supplemented by Administrative guidance, which provides
that EIP submissions "[S] hall be sufficient, together with a transportation control program, to achieve the specific annual reductions in
CO emissions set forth in the implementation plan by the attainment date." This broad language supports the Ninth Circuit's holding because it suggests that a state may impose requirements to

158. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (b) (explaining that "[I]t is the policy of Congress to
recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and fights of the
states to ...

eliminate pollution . . ."). Id. Congress further stated here its back-

ground role of supporting and aiding research and providing technical services
and financial aid. See id.
159. See Ellen M. Zahren, Overfiling Under Federalism: Federal Nipping at State
Heels to Protect the Environment, 49 EMORY L.J. 373, 379 (2000) (discussing RCRA
recognition of primary state responsibility to collect and dispose of solid waste).
160. See Dwyer, supra note 151, at 216. The role of the federal agency in
shared regulatory programs such as the NAAQS program is threefold: first, the
federal agency sets substantive standards for emissions, second, it reviews and approves flexible SIPs designed to enforce these standards, and third, it only re-assumes federal implementation and enforcement if the state efforts slip below a
specific threshold. See id. (discussing states as "junior partners" to federal government regarding environmental regulatory schemes).
161. See Exxon, 217 F.3d at 1255 (stating that term "EIP" applies to "incentives
and requirements to reduce fuel emissions and vehicle miles traveled . . .").
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 7512a(g) (requiring submission of revised SIP containing
economic incentives program for failure of serious area to attain national CO standard); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(g) (4) (permitting any transportation control
under § 7408(f) to be part of economic incentives program required in revised
SIPs).
163. See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(f) (xii) (charging Administrator to publish information regarding formulation and emission reduction potential of transportation
control measures).
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reduce vehicle emissions that are merely adequate to achieve the
6
states' goals under its SIP.1 4

Section 7512a(b) (3) (A) further states that the SIP revisions for
CO emission controls must also include a program for implementation and enforcement of the control "consistent with guidance to
be issued by the Administrator."' 6 5 Recent EPA guidance suggests
that EPA now seems to favor a more clement approach regarding
SIP requirements and novel approaches to reducing mobile source
66

emissions. 1

CAA's sanction provisions, for failure to achieve the national
CO standard, support the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that primary
regulatory responsibility is assigned to the states.' 67 CAA mandates
that each SIP provide "enforceable emissions limitations" to meet
CAA requirements. 16 Failure to submit or implement a plan allows
the Administrator, with the Secretary of Transportation's approval,
to prohibit any highway projects or the awarding of any grants to a
non-attainment area.169 If a state fails to achieve the national stan164. See

NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON ENVq-

RONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES: INTERAGENCY ASSESSMENT OF OXYGENATED Fu-

(visited Oct. 10, 2000) <http://www.epa.gov/oms/regs/fuels/ostp-O.pdf>
(interpreting CAA oxygenate requirements for CO non-attainment areas as being
at least 2.7 percent).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 7512a(b) (3) (A) (requiring SIP revisions to include program
for implementation and enforcement of oxygenated gasoline requirement consistent with Administrator's guidance).
166. See Memorandum from Richard D. Wilson, Acting Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, to EPA Regional Administrators 4 (Oct. 24, 1997) (on
file with author) (announcing EPA plans to use its authority under CAA to allow
SIP credit for new approaches to reducing mobile source emissions). But see Memorandum from Sheldon Meyers, Director's Office of Air Quality Planning and
Standards, to Director, Air and Waste Management Division Regions II-IV, VI-VIII,
X (Jul. 29, 1983) (on file with author) (recommending that EPA Regional Administrators determine whether SIP revisions are appropriate administrative mechanisms to handle state goals and that SIP revisions must be adequately supported
with data and modeling demonstrations).
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (enumerating sanctions for failure regarding nonattainment areas).
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2) (A) (requiring states to include enforceable
emissions controls in SIPs).
169. See 42 U.S.C § 7509(a) (1) (1994)(enumerating circumstances for failure
to submit implementation plans); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (b) (1) (A) (allowing EPA
Administrator to impose prohibitions on highway projects and grants to non-attainment areas that fail to submit plans or fail to implement requirement of plan
upon approval of Secretary of Transportation). Congress may use the highway
sanction under both its power to promote the general welfare and the Commerce
Power, except as a means of outright coercion. See Virginia v. EPA, 80 F.3d 869,
881 (4th Cir. 1996). The Fourth Circuit held that these highway sanctions do not
violate the Tenth Amendment or the spending power; the sanctions induce change
without coercing it (emphasis added). See id. at 880. The Fourth Circuit held that
because CAA sanctions only prohibit funds in non-attainment areas without interELS
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dard in a non-attainment area, it must submit a revised plan within
one year that may include any additional measures that the EPA
Administrator may reasonably prescribe. 170 Therefore, although
primary responsibility for attaining NAAQS resides with the states,
the federal government has not completely abdicated its enforcement role; states have a significant incentive to submit plans with
171
measures specifically designed to meet federal requirements.
The Ninth Circuit's holding allows states to avoid federal chastisement by customizing their SIPs with local requirements designed to
meet NAAQS despite specific local obstacles, such as topography or
weather conditions. 172 As a result, this type of disciplinary incentive
supports the Ninth Circuit's broad reading of CAA oxygenate
3
requirements. 17
B.

Fifty States With Fifty Individual Environmental Obstacles
Suggests Upward Mobility of Federal CAA Minimums

Local officials complain that federal rigidity inhibits the ability
of states to enact sensible environmental policies.1 74 Commentators have questioned the rationality of federal standards applied
uniformly on a national scale, noting the sheer diversity of the envifeing with funds granted to attainment areas, and because federal monies may
still be spent on highway projects that promote highway safety or a reduction in air
pollution, the sanctions are not coercive. See id. at 881-82.
170. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509(d) (1) (2) (permitting Administrator to reasonably
prescribe any means necessary in revised SIP in light of technological feasibility
and costs to achieve NAAQS when states with non-attainment areas fail to achieve
NAAQS). The Fourth Circuit held that the offset sanctions, which allow EPA Administrator to limit new construction of stationary sources of air pollution, are constitutional because they burden only private parties by regulating private pollution
sources without burdening the state as a governmental unit. See Virginia, 80 F.3d at
882. Under CAA, failure to meet the CO milestone mandates a revised state plan
that includes an economic incentive or transportation control designed specifically
to achieve the required CO reductions. See 42 U.S.C § 7512a(d) (3) (discussing
states' incurred consequences for failure to meet CO milestone). The CO "milestone" is defined as the "reduction in emissions of CO equivalent to the total of the
specific annual emission reductions required by December 31, 1995." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7512a(d) (1).
171. See Dwyer, supra note 151, at 216 (discussing EPA's generally background
role after SIP approval but noting its ability to ensure that state enforcement agencies seek sufficiently strict sanctions).
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See Adler, supranote 52, at 577 (noting that local authorities often complain that federal mandates hamper states' ability to enact sensible environmental
policies). In the words of Michigan Governor John Engler, the EPA "has increasingly overstepped its bounds and usurped the lawmaking responsibilities of Congress and stepped on the state's ability to implement environmental reform." See
Governor John Engler, Speech Before Warren T. Brookes Fellowship Memorial
Dinner, November 19, 1996.
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ronments in all fifty states. 175 For example, the United States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations stated that

federal environmental regulations are often "complex, conflicting,
76
difficult to apply, adversarial, costly, inflexible, and uncertain."'
Excessive costs of attaining national standards result in frequent violations of these requirements. 17 7 EPA has yet to develop a clear
78
guideline for judging when its regulations are truly appropriate.1
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit recently re-instituted the doctrine
of nondelegation and applied it to EPA under CAA.1 79 Under this
doctrine, open-ended statutory terms will be invalidated unless
agencies are able to specify the governing legal criteria. 80 Although the D.C. Circuit ruled only against EPA regarding ozone
regulations, the non-delegation doctrine invites further constitutional questions concerning other EPA regulations as well. 18 1 In
terms of pollution regulation, EPA must produce "floors" and "ceilings" to limit its own discretion or face unconstitutionality invectives.182 So long as ceilings and floors are in place and the space
between them is not excessive, then agency discretion is sufficiently

175. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?,98 MICH. L. REV.
303, 308 (1999) (noting irrationality of national environmental regulations applied to fifty states of widely varying environmental dispositions).
176. Robert V. Percival, EnvironmentalFederalism: HistoricalRoots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD.L. REV. 1141, 1165 (1995) (quoting U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, Intergovernmental Decisionmaking for Environmental Protection and Public Works 1 (1992)).

177. See George Eads, The Confusion of Goals and Instruments: The Explicit Con-

sideration of Cost in Setting NAAQS, in To BREATHE FREELY: ISK, CONSENT, AND AIR
223, 228-35 (Mary Gibson ed., 1985) (noting that excessively high costs of attainment of national standards give rise to frequent violations of these standards).
178. See Sunstein, supra note 175, at 320 (noting that EPA has not developed
consistent guidelines for defending appropriateness of its regulations).
179. See American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(holding that provisions under CAA that give EPA authority to issue national air
quality standards represent unconstitutional delegation of legislative power). The
D.C. Circuit held that since EPA failed to articulate intelligible principles channeling its application of factors used to determine the degree of public health concern associated with ozone, and since none are apparent in CAA, EPA has
unfettered discretion to set NAAQS. See id. at 1034.
180. See Sunstein, supra note 175, at 309 (discussing tenets of nondelegation
doctrine).
181. See id. at 310 (discussing possibility of significant constitutional ramifications if nondelegation doctrine is applied to other EPA regulations). This doctrine would also call into question the constitutional basis for several other federal
regulatory schemes, such as the Federal Communications Commission or the Federal Aviation Administration. See id.
182. See Sunstein, supra note 175, at 348 (discussing nondelegation doctrine
influence on EPA regulations in terms of narrow limits).
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restricted to fend off constitutional attacks.' 8 Yet, the D.C. Circuit
also recognized that states have broad discretion under CAA in determining the manner in which they will achieve compliance with
NAAQS, and EPA cannot reject a state's SIP based upon its view of
"the wisdom of a state's choices of emission limitations."' s4 This
holding suggests that permitting state flexibility to raise federal
minimums could alleviate constitutionality questions over federally
generated standards, because each state's SIP revision proposal to
EPA must contain adequate data, modeling demonstrations, and
18 5
other findings justifying the state's needs.

C.

The Holdings in Chevron and Union Electric Support the
Ninth Circuit's Broad Reading of CAA Oxygenate
Requirements

Other aspects of the Chevron holding, in addition to those the
Ninth Circuit examined in detail, also support the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion. For example, the Supreme Court in Chevron concluded
that the Administrator's interpretation of CAA was reasonable because the regulatory scheme is patently complex, the decision involved reconciling conflicting policies, and the Administrator's
accommodation was reasonable. 186 Similarly, CAA, like most other
EPA regulations, has only grown more complex since the Chevron
87

case. 1

The Supreme Court in Chevron held that in cases where the
legislative delegation to any agency on a particular question is implicit, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator
183. See id. at 359 (stating that agency discretion is properly constrained if
boundaries to its discretion exist).
184. See American Trucking, 175 F.3d at 1044 (holding that states have broad
discretion in designing SIPs and that EPA Administrator cannot reject SIPs on
basis of wisdom of state's choice of emissions limitations).
185. See Dwyer, supranote 151, at 216 (requiring scrutiny of SIP revisions with
special attention to state findings as criterion for approval); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 7511 (a) (detailing plan submissions and requirements).
186. See Cheuron, 467 U.S. at 865 (upholding EPA Administrator's construction of CAA as reasonable because of regulatory scheme's complexity, agency's
detailed consideration, and because decision involved reconciling conflicting policies). The Court actually suggested that since Congress did not specifically destroy
the ambiguity at issue, it may have deliberately desired the Administrator to balance the competing interests involved. See id. The Court also noted that while the
agency itself is not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive most
certainly is, and therefore it is entirely appropriate for the agency to make policy
choices in interpreting CAA. See id.
187. See Adler, supra note 52, at 617.
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of an agency.' 88 The text of CAA regarding oxygenate minimums is
relatively ambiguous, and the Administrator reasonably accommo-

dates both federal and state interests, consequently the approval of
the Clark County increase should be entitled to Chevron deference.
In Union Electric Co. v. EPA, the Supreme Court specifically held

that CAA requires SIPs to contain controls "as may be necessary" to
achieve air quality standards, meaning that the Administrator must

assure the minimal requirements are met, not that he "detect and
reject any state plan more demanding than federal law requires."1 89
The Court in Union also noted that if states could only adopt
stricter standards outside of their SIPs, the Administrator would be
forced to expend impractical time and energy poring over an SIP
simply to ascertain whether it exactly meets federal regulatory standards, and it would require states desiring more stringent standards
to enact a second, redundant set of standards. 190 In sum, the Supreme Court in Union Electric held that "State [s] ha [ve] virtually absolute power in allocating emission limitations so long as the
national standards are met... ."91 This decision stands in opposition to the Third Circuit's decision one year earlier in St. Joe Miner-

als Corp. v. EPA, which held that states may enforce stricter
regulations only by promulgating state laws, outside of the SIP.19 2
The Ninth Circuit was also justified in pursuing a different statutory analysis than the First and Second Circuits. Although the
First and Second Circuits narrowly construed similar provisions of
CAA, Exxon can be distinguished from the holdings in Cahill and
MassachusettsDep't. ofEnvtl. Protectionbecause they concerned differ188. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (holding that administrative agency's
power to administer congressionally created program necessarily requires policy to
fill implicit gaps, and that agency administrator's reasonable interpretation of statutory provision blocks any court from substituting its own construction).
189. Union, 427 U.S. at 263 (holding that text in CAA requiring SIPs to contain control devices "as may be necessary" to achieve federal standards does not
preclude states from adopting higher standards). The Court went on to note that
subsequent legislation supports this reading: the 1974 Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act [ESECA] allows the EPA Administrator to review SIPs
and notify states ifthey can relax their controls without interfering with attainment
of the national air quality standards. See id. at 263 n.10. Since the ultimate decision to relax the controls rests with the states, the Court concluded that the ESECA
illustrates congressional approval of the instance where federally approved SIPs
may be stricter than necessary for attainment of national standards. See id.
190. See id. at 264 (rejecting argument against states' ability to adopt stricter
standards than federal regulations because of impractical and burdensome results
imposed on both states and EPA Administrator).
191. Id. at 267 (discussing state control over emission limitations as only limited by failure to meet national standards).
192. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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ent provisions of CAA than the oxygenate requirement at issue in
Exxon.' 93 The First and Second Circuits noted that CAA explicitly
provides that "[n]o state.., shall adopt or attempt to enforce any
standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles
or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part . . .. 194 The CAA
provision for CO emissions in non-attainment areas, section
7545(c)(4)(A), denotes similar restrictions regarding fuel additives. 1 95 The First and Second Circuits, however, did not include an
examination of state authority under CAA in their analyses in Cahill
and MassachusettsDep't. of Envtl. Protection.196 Instead, both courts

first found that the ZEV sales requirement was an "emissions standard" rather than an "enforcement" protocol and then concluded
that the requirement was therefore preempted, because the applicable CAA provision preempts state standards. 1 97 The preemption
language of section 7545 (c) (4) (A) uses the words "control or prohibition respecting any.., component of a fuel .... ",198 The Ninth
Circuit distinguished the oxygenate standards at issue in Exxon from
the fuel components regulated in CAA, and as a result, justified its
approach by searching elsewhere under CAA. 199
VI.

IMPACT

Despite CAA's inherent nature as an environmental regulatory
quagmire of federalist concerns, the Ninth Circuit seems to have
elucidated a workable path to cooperative federalism. Commentators have noted that CAA truly aims to establish a "partnership" between the federal government and the states in its execution and
2
implementation. oo
193. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
194. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (emphasis added) (prohibiting states from adopting
or enforcing emissions standards for new motor vehicles or motor vehicle
engines).
195. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c) (4) (A).
196. See Cahill, 152 F.3d at 199-201; see also Massachusetts Dep't. of Envtl. Protec-

tion, 163 F.3d at 82-87. Both courts conducted extremely fact-specific analyses;
neither ventured too far away from CAA provisions dealing specifically with emissions standards for new cars and new engines. See id.
197. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
200. See Walter G. Wright, Jr. and Mary Ellen Henry, The Arkansas Air Pollution Control Program:Past, Present & Future,51 ARK. L. Rrv. 227, 233 (1998) (discussing role of federal government and states as partners in implementing CAA
programs). For example, one commentator notes:
I believe such problems flow from an historically inaccurate EPA
interpretation of the intent of Congress regarding the scope of federal
jurisdiction. Until recently, the mode of behavior at EPA suggested that
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First, in Exxon, the Ninth Circuit reiterates the 1990 CAA
amendment balance of federal and state authority. On the one
hand, truly centralized environmental regulatory control, enforcing
preemptive federal law through local field offices, is likely to be politically and even constitutionally implausible. 2° 1 Without political
support, controversial environmental programs promulgated by a
detached federal government that inevitably regulates local land
20 2
use, economics, and lifestyle are likely to meet strong opposition.
On the other hand, truly decentralized control invites states to
grant unacceptable concessions to industry by lowering regulatory
standards to remedy revenue problems and fulfill economic interests. 20 3 The Ninth Circuit's decision in Exxon assuages federal fear
of state acquiescence of federally mandated standards but maintains states' local flexibility to serve its specific environmental needs

via the SIP.204
Secondly, the federal government's efforts to implement all of
its environmental regulations without the help of the states would
very likely prove futile. 20 5 The federal government is dependent
upon local authorities to execute its regulatory will because of the
nation's size and environmental diversity and because of the significant relationship between local environmental controls and local
the agency was the supreme regulatory arbiter, and state and local governments were to act as minions subject to federal mandate. Yet, if one
examines the jurisdiction established by each of the major federal environmental statutes, one will see that Congress did not preempt state authority regarding environmental regulation. This was quite deliberate.
Congress chose to recognize concurrent state and federal jurisdiction instead of preempting states' authority. The state and federal governments
were to be equal partners working together.
Id. at n.37.
201. See Robert A. Kagan, Trying to Have It Both Ways: Local Discretion, Central
Control, and Adversarial Legalism in American Environmental Regulation, 25 ECOLOGY

L. Q 718, 731 (1999) (discussing political implausibility of truly centralized environniental regulatory power).
202. See Adler, supra, note 52, at 579 (discussing necessity of local political
support for federal environmental programs whose dramatic effect on local land
use and lifestyle is inevitably controversial).
203. See Kagan, supra note 201, at 732 (discussing fears generated by truly
decentralized environmental regulation).
204. See Lauren MacLanahan, Polychlorinated Biphenyls and the "Mega Rule" Will It Have the Mega-Impact the EPA Desired?,24 WM. & MARY ENXrrL. L. & POL'Y REV.
345, 366 (2000) (discussing that "command and control" model of environmental
regulation, in which Congress establishes directive to reduce emissions, and EPA
creates attainment standard halved amount of CO emissions in last twenty years).
Command and control methods set performance standards that are based on the
best available technologies. See id.
205. See Adler, supra, note 52, at 577 (stating that federal government could
not hope to implement all of its environmental regulatory programs on its own).
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land-use regulations. 20 6 To succeed in a given location, environ20 7
mental policy must be customized for particular local conditions.
State and local officials have a degree of experience and expertise
in handling local problems that is likely to be outside the grasp of
208
federal agencies.
Yet some say that commentators are preoccupied with the political division of environmental regulatory power between the government and the states.2 0 9 Many radical critics advocate the
wholesale transfer of environmental regulatory power back to the
states. 2 10 Currently, EPA seems hesitant to weave overly tight controls into its regulatory policy. 2 11 Regarding fuel additives, EPA
seems open to lowering or eliminating the minimum oxygen requirement to aid refiners in choosing which fuel additives to use
and during which seasons to use them.2 12 This flexibility of implementation affords the federal program a pricier long-term viability
2 13
rather than an untenable uniformity.
206. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1200
(1997) (detailing federal government's dependence upon state and local authorities to implement federal environmental regulatory policy).
207. See Adler, supra note 52, at 579 (stating that environmental regulation in
any given location will only be successful if it is customized to satisfy local
conditions).
208. See id. (stating that local experts have knowledge that is unobtainable by
national agency experts).
209. See Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 351, 353 (2000) (discussing why no recent analyses of devolution of regulatory authority to states considers impact on public health).
210. See id. at 354 (discussing radical position of critics that advocate total
devolution of environmental regulatory power from federal government to states.)
211. See Dwyer, supra note 27, at 1207 (claiming that EPA is not willing to
overburden states with controls). In the 1970s, Congress alienated the states by
mandating transportation control programs in SIPs without giving states adequate
time to fully address their ramifications. See id. (discussing congressional alienation of states through excessively ephemeral SIP submission schedules).
212. See Proposed Rules: Environmental Protection Agency: Regulation of
Fuel and Fuel Additives: Reformulated Gasoline Adjustment, 65 Fed. Reg. 42920,
42922 (2000). EPA stated:
We seek comment on whether we should propose elimination of the
per gallon oxygen minimum. We believe such action might provide additional flexibility to refiners in their choice of oxygenates. Elimination of
the per gallon minimum may allow refiners to use little or no oxygenate
during the summer ozone season, thus reducing the modest cost associated with summer ethanol use ... We request comment on the alternative approach of lowering, rather than removing the oxygen minimum,
which would retain the benefits of the requirement while reducing the
small potential for any adverse impacts.
213. See Dwyer, supra note 151, at 220 (discussing practical impact of state
environmental regulation).
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EPA estimates that overall compliance with CAA will cost the
private sector $500 billion. 2 14 In terms of meeting the oxygenate
requirements under CAA, fuel marketers must pay as much as an
extra 10 cents per gallon of fuel because of the extra refining required. 2 15 Furthermore, EPA recently attempted to promulgate a
new rule mandating that a minimum percentage of oxygenate fuel
additives come from renewable sources. 2 16 The financial consequences of this ruling were estimated to exact $50-$300 million
from consumers per year. 2 17 The principle argument in Union Electric asserted that compliance with CAA would cost the petitioner
$500 million for equipment installation and over $120 million per
year in maintenance and operating costs, which it argued was prohibitive. 2 18 Although it is possible that the federal standards are
214. See Sunstein, supra note 175, at 307 (noting EPA's total cost estimate to
private sector for complete compliance with CAA).
215. See Adler, supra note 52, at 577 (discussing increased costs of fuel due to
incorporation of oxygenate requirements under CAA in refining process). The
cost of complying with pollution control standards rarely inflicts significant damage to historically profitable companies. See William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and InstitutionalDeterminism, WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
REV., 1, 6 (1997) (discussing relatively innocuous effect of compliance costs on
historically profitable companies). Companies operating at the margin of profitability, however, can be driven out of business by hefty compliance costs. See id. at
7 (discussing detrimental effects of compliance costs on marginally lucrative
firms).
216. See 59 Fed. Reg. 39258, 39258 (1994) (requiring that 30% of oxygen required by CAA to be used in reformulated gasoline be derived from renewable
feed stocks). EPA's stated policy is to reduce dependency on fossil fuels to meet
the requirements of the reformulated gasoline program. See id. This Final Rule
also required that "gasoline sold in certain areas be reformulated to achieve the
greatest possible reductions in vehicle emissions of toxic and ozone-forming compounds." Id. The D.C. Circuit invalidated this Rule, holding that EPA was not
statutorily authorized to adopt renewable oxygenate regulations because they are
not directed toward the reduction of Volatile Organic Compounds [VOCs]. See
American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
217. SeeJonathan H. Adler, EPA in Need of Adult Supervision (visited Oct. 12,

2000) <http://www.cei.org/UpdateReader.asp?ID=933> (discussing increased consumer costs resulting from compliance EPA ruling that 30% of oxygenates come
from renewable sources).
218. See Union, 427 U.S. at 272 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring) (reviewing petitioner's argument that compulsory compliance with CAA will incur prohibitive installation and maintenance costs). It is, however, important to note that even
Justice Powell recognized the danger of inflexible federal environmental regulations. See id. at 272. He realized that forced compliance with CAA could likely
drive an urban area's principal power supplier out of business and result in substantially greater risk to public health and welfare. See id.
Moreover, according to Professor Kirsten Engel's game theory model of state
environmental regulatory behavior, although states compete intensely for new industrial facilities, environmental costs are a relatively small part of a firm's decision
to locate within a particular state. See Dwyer, supra note 27, at 225 (noting in Engel's model that labor market structure, infrastructure quality, taxes, schools, and
market access weigh more heavily than environmental cost concerns). Engel also
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excessively stringent in terms of general state preference, under a
flexible compromise of authority, states will maintain the ability to
prioritize their development projects and, within limits, decide how
19
to enforce their regulations to best serve local interests. 2
Sean Patrick Mahoney
notes that "a significant number of state officials mistakenly believe that concerns
about the cost of complying with environmental standards make a significant difference in a firm's decision. See id.
219. See Dwyer, supra note 151, at 217 (discussing significant state role in hybrid system of national environmental standards coupled with state implementation and enforcement).
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